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Abstract 
The use of modern medical technologies and interventions involves ethical and legal 
dilemmas which are yet to be solved. For the religious Jews the answer lies in Halakhah. 
The objective of this paper is to unscramble the difficult conundrum possessed by the 
halakhalic standing concerning the use of human embryonic cell for research. It also aims to 
take contemporary ethical issues arising from the use of technologies and medical advances 
made in human reproduction and study them from an abstract philosophical perspective. 
Instead of providing any Jewish practical ruling the paper have tried to incite, stimulate and 
encourage philosophical thoughts about the issue through the intensive understanding of 
traditional Jewish thoughts. 
In this paper, an objective as well as a deep-rooted study has been adopted about the use of 
human embryos for research and the Jewish adoption of assisted reproductive technologies 
through the prism of the knowledge of Halakhah, Torah and Talmud.  
The paper finds that the embryo research sits at the crossroads of many halakhalic issues. 
Judaism adopts the belief that God has created man in his own image. The Jews not being 
dogmatic decipher “the image” of the creator as the ability to discern and reason. It follows 
that Judaism does not subscribe to the notion that tampering with nature is prohibited. To the 
Jews the mitzvah for procreation is so great that they are open to reason and adopt newer 
medical advancement in procreation. The Jewish laws are not only for engagement in 
intellectual exercise or academic pursuit but subscribe to a higher order of moral conduct. 
The Jewish approach is not situational but also casuistic in resolving conflicting medical 
issues. 
Keywords: embryo experimentation, Judaism, human assisted reproductive technologies, 
philosophical considerations, theology, Halakhah    
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Introduction 
 
Embryo Experimentation involves a cluster of reproductive technologies. Advances in 
reproductive technologies have spawned a very polarised public debate concerning these 
technologies. Religion has a considerable influence over the public’s attitudes towards 
reproductive technologies. The views of active and influential religious adherents have a 
prominent role to play in public policy decision making procedure about this research. 
Looking back on the early works concerning Assisted Reproductive Technologies, henceforth 
ARTs we would be struck by how far our reactions to these technologies have come since the 
decades leading to the birth of the first test tube baby in the year 1978. IVF is no longer 
shrouded in the “doom-laden scenarios” as was represented in the texts concerning 
reproductive technology of the 1920s and 1930s. Aldous Huxley had anticipated the 
impending “Brave New World” resulting from the development of more precise methods and 
techniques of Eugenetic intervention and reproductive technologies of human species. 
 
These technologies have been the subject of extensive normative debates in Bioethics, 
Philosophy and Religion. This paper seeks to explain our preliminary reflections on how 
religious communities respond to and assess the ethics of reproductive technologies. 
Arguably, the advancement of science in the human reproduction especially the ARTs are to 
be met with resistance from religion. Religious doctrines are likely to collide with the rapidly 
advancing capability for science to make such interventions in human reproductions. If 
religious belief is supposed to be the counter factor in the path of the development of ARTs, 
the crucial ingredient for acceptance of such scientific technologies are prototypically 
supposed to be scientific literary-that is familiarity and proper understanding of the critical 
facts concerning these technologies. So, proper medical awareness and scientific knowledge 
would put to rest the opposition being met out to these medical technologies. This paper aims 
to make a critical review of the Jewish insight into medical development concerning 
reproductive technologies. The paper also takes up the issue about the status of incest or 
mamzerim in the Jewish philosophical discussion resulting due to the artificial insemination 
of a woman by a donor other than that of her husband. The matter at stake here is that the 
application of artificial insemination by donor (AID) leads to a whole range of problems in 
the areas of family and succession law due to the fact that the origination of an AID child 
might not be a matter of public knowledge. At the same time AID may be the only hope for 
an infertility problem. This paper is divided into three sections. In the first section we would 
explore the Jewish view on Medical Ethics. The second section would provide an insight into 
the moral status of “embryo” in the Jewish philosophy. In the third section we will explore 
the Jewish take on the modern reproductive technologies discussing whether reproductive 
technologies with the use of embryo finds acceptance in Jewish religion. It also tries to find 
the halakhic answer to the question whether or not reproductive technologies constitute 
adultery.  
 
Jewish Religion and its Ideas about Medical Ethics 
 
Judaism is divided into three main branches: “Orthodox”, “Conservative” and “Reformed”. 
The Orthodox Judaism maintains that they are more religious in comparison to the 
Conservative and Reformed. Orthodox Judaism claims to follow the traditional Jewish 
religion unlike the Conservative and Reformed. The basic tenets of Judaism are the revealed 
words of God which have been passed down at Mount Sinai and witnessed by large number 
of people. These divine revelations were referred to as “Torah”. The “Torah” consists of the 
classical “written” and “oral” rules. The written “Torah” comprised of the five books of 
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Moses and the oral Torah. The oral “Torah” is the “Talmud” which amounts to the divine 
revelations given on Mount Sinai to the Jews as discussed by Jewish sages. The oral Torah is 
cumbersome and is subject to constant expansion made by religious scholars, rabbis in the 
form of legal views and counter-opinions regarding the interpretation of the Torah. So the 
Talmud comprises laws or rules subject to commentary, clarification and expansion of the 
written Torah comprising of the agreements and interpretations or disagreement of views and 
opinions of the religious scholars, rabbis down through the centuries. The Orthodox Jews call 
“Halakhah1” the whole legal system of Judaism encompassing all the laws, practices and 
observances of Judaism. So the “Halakhah” finds its source in the written law, comprising of 
both positive and negative commandments of Sinaitic origin as included in the books of the 
Pentateuch. The other source includes the oral law comprising of the detailed explanations 
and elucidation transmitted in its entirety at Sinai, and is also comprised of rabbinical 
decrees, customs with both positive and negative enactments, and so forth. The law that has 
Sinaitic origination is called de-oryata, which is different from laws of rabbinical source, 
called de-rabbanam.          
 
Jewish Medical Ethics is founded upon the Sinaic revelation. Some of the fundamental 
principles the Jewish medical ethics are based upon are: 
 
Firstly, Judaism is grounded upon obligations, duties and commitments. It relies on 
commandments, rather than on rights and pure hedonism. Beneficence and altruism are more 
important than mere non-maleficence. 
 
Secondly, Judaism does not adopt any single precept. It advocates the middle path or golden 
means.  
 
Thirdly, within Jewish sources, progeny is considered as precious. Judaism understands 
propagation not only as a blessing, but a commandment. The Jewish principles stresses in the 
supremacy of life. However when there is any conflicting situation Judaism in general prefers 
the casuistic approach to resolve halakhik questions. It believes in examining each situation 
according to individual circumstances and develops response according to details and 
characteristics of situation.  
 
In fact, Judaism recognises absolutism with respect to eternity of Torah. At the same time for 
Judaism there is no definitive value that may be absolute so that it takes precedence in every 
circumstance.  
 
Jewish laws are not only for engagement in intellectual exercise or academic analysis. They 
subscribe to a higher order of moral conduct, obligating the individual and society to act 
accordingly. They highly value the principle of autonomy as a concept of respect for others. 
However, autonomous decisions which are not in accordance with the required moral 
standards are overridden by higher moral values, as determined by Halakhah, which 
overrules the life of each individual, inclusive of those of patient and physician. Where 
conflicting values arise, individual action is to be governed by the required normative moral 
conduct  (Steinberg, 1998, pp. 624–645). 
 
 
																																								 																				1	“Halakhah” is usually translated as Jewish Law, although a literal and appropriate translation means “the path that one 
walks”.  The word is derived from the Hebrew root Hei-Lamed-Kaf, meaning to go or to walk. 
 (Cohn-Sherbok, 2005) and (Jastrow, 1903)	
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Jewish Standing on Embryo’s “Sanctity of Life” 
 
Reviewing the Jewish standpoint about experimentation with embryo for procreative or 
therapeutic ends, the question that might gain significance is whether embryos are susceptible 
to the sanctity of life as preordained to any sentient human being. This discussion will be 
restricted to the Halakhah issues related to the use of embryo for research. The discussion 
concerns the status of pre-implantation embryos or pre-embryo and their use for research.  
 
Some rabbis may question whether pre-embryo be upgraded to be foetus in-utero. If that be 
so, then the discussion of the status of pre-embryo would be within the parameter of the 
abortion debate. Accordingly, the use of embryo research would be tantamount to killing, if 
abortion is held as akin to homicide. Judaism has always glorified and exalted the value of 
“life” and placed it at the highest echelon. In fact Torah is not only a Jewish philosophical 
system but is called a “tree of life” (Unterman, 1971, p. 125) (Proverbs 3:17–18). Judaism 
celebrates “life” and the loss of a single life tantamount to the loss of whole world; equally, 
saving one life would lead to saving the world. If abortion is debarred on the charge of it 
being life-annihilating, perhaps by extension human embryo research would be disallowed. 
Those against advocating abortion would justify the prohibition of abortion or embryo 
research on the grounds of it being destruction of future life. Thus, performing abortion 
amounts to homicide. To this charge of murder raised against abortion some Jewish scholars 
quote the Exodus 21:22-23 (King James Version) which reads: “If men strive, and hurt a 
woman with child, so that her fruit depart from her, and yet no mischief follow: he shall be 
surely punished, according as the woman’s husband will lay upon him; and he shall pay as 
the judge determine. And if any mischief follows, then thou shalt give life for life.” (Norton, 
2006) As Shalon Paul (Paul, 1970, p. 71) asserts, the loss of embryo is entailed by pecuniary 
settlement. One thing is clear both from the critical and historical dogmatic aspects: abortion 
is not homicide; the embryos death does not carry the death penalty, rather the mother’s death 
entails the giving “life for life”. So the Jewish faith agrees on the foetus having no 
independent life; it is under the parent custody, otherwise its loss or damage would not have 
led to a claim for monetary compensation.  
 
There are again pro-life forces that are against the ethical permissibility of the taking of the 
embryo at its earliest stage for it involves killing a future human life. Charles Krauthammer 
(Krauthammer, 2001, p. 201) reacts by stating that the pro-life argument fails. The research 
using human embryos is either produced from in-vitro fertilisation or from aborted foetuses. 
Also, if we are to delve we may find the fallacy of ambiguity of language for the verb 
“killing” is not synonymous to “to taking”. The embryonic cells are taken or find their source 
either in IVF or foetal tissue, which is spare or aborted. There is the incorrect semantic use of 
the verb “take” with respect to “kill”. As Krauthammer (Krauthamer, 2001, p. 202) 
summarises, what is of importance is not the origin but the destiny of embryo research. 
 
Drawing upon the wealth of divergent philosophical and theological reflections and situating 
ourselves relative to it, the divergent views highlight the ambiguity inherent in the moral 
status of “embryo”. According to Judaism, saving life pushes aside all other values and 
commandments, yet it holds there is no reason to save one life for the sake of another. 
According to Jewish law, the life of the foetus becomes inconsequential, as aborting them 
becomes necessary to save the mothers’ lives (Maimonides, 1992).  The Halakhah does not 
assign relative values to different lives. Now, while evaluating whether pre-embryos are 
subjected to the same prohibition as abortion one takes into consideration the laws assigned 
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for abortion. To quote Genesis 9:6 – “Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his 
blood be shed”. The Jubilee Bible 2000 translates the Genesis as “Whoever sheds man’s 
blood in man, his blood shall be shed”. In the Sanhedrin, Rabbi Yishmael states that to say 
“man by man” literally is “in man” and this can refer to a foetus in its mother’s womb. 
Therefore, the loss of a foetus within the mother’s womb would amount to killing.  
 
Based on this, the prohibition of abortion is not covered by the laws about pre-embryos. A 
pre-embryo is not potential life until it is implanted in an environment conducive for 
maturation. Rabbinic authorities do not consider the pre-embryo akin to a foetus in-utero as it 
is placed outside the womb and requires implantation (Rosner & Reichman, 2002, p. 57). 
Pre-embryos may be considered by some Jewish law as emitted reproductive seeds. 
Considerably, if embryos be relegated to the status of reproductive seed, then they would be 
subjected to the laws of hash’chatat zera (destruction of the “seeds” of life). The alternative 
hypothesis is; if the sperm has been deposited in the woman, the primary forbiddance of 
hash’chatat zera becomes ineffective.2 Also the laws of hash’chatat zera apply to wasteful 
emission of seeds and not destruction of seeds. Then the problem at stake is about the 
destruction of seeds. Strikingly, the embryo prior to birth is not a “nefesh” or “human being” 
according to the Halakhic interpretation. 
  
The major rabbinic authorities consider the embryo prior to 40 days of conception as merely 
water (Bleich, 1977, pp. 339–347) and lacks moral and legal consideration. We quote from 
the Babylonian Talmud, Mas Yevamoth 69b: “For if she is not found pregnant she never was 
pregnant, and if she is found pregnant the semen, until the fortieth day, is only a mere fluid.” 
(Yevamoth, pp. 2931–3529; Jakobovits, 1959, p. 275) The embryo within the first days being 
mere water, its removal would not amount to destruction of life.  
 
Questions may arise on whether the prohibition against infanticide at the early stage stands 
ineffectual. The forty days marker becomes a debatable issue at times. Rabbi Wosner argues 
the violation for pre-forty day foetus would not be applicable to a pre-embryo (Rosner & 
Reichman, Embryonic Stem Cell Researh in Jewish Law, 2002, p. 58). As Rabbi Elyashiv 
rules, pre-embryo is not a foetus and is not covered by prohibition so is discarded. Rabbi 
Halperin (Halperin, pp. 55–62) adds that to save a mother’s life, if one dismembers a foetus 
in-utero, and then there may be no harm to consent to the usage of pre-embryo which is less 
than the foetus for life-saving purposes. Instead of discarding embryos, they could be used 
for meaningful purposes. From the testimony of Rabbi Elliot N. Dorff mentioned in the 
NBAC (Dorff, 2000, pp. C–4) we may conclude that an embryo bereft of the status of full-
fledged human be allowed for research. Since organ transplant is allowed for others to live, 
we may also allow a part of a human body, in this case the embryo, for benefitting others. 
Jewish tradition views health care as a communal responsibility. Thus research with embryo 
for purposeful reasons would be permitted keeping at bay the enhancement issue concerning 
embryonic research.      
 
Judaism and Reproductive Technologies 
 
According to Judaism, procreation is viewed as a positive duty (mitzvah) and a sign of 
prosperity. The Biblical commandment to “be fruitful and multiply” finds expression in 
Jewish thought. However the reformed Jewish law exempts women in general from the 
obligation to “be fruitful and multiply”. Despite the reformed outlook of Jewish tradition, 
																																								 																				2	Nida 13b and Responsa Chavot Yair, no. 31. Responsa Sheilot Yaavetz, no. 43	
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“barrenness” has been viewed as a curse. So the uses of new reproductive technologies are 
permitted in Jewish tradition. Medical technologies designed to treat infertility are acceptable 
by the Jewish law or Halakhah. The Rabbis, the religious leaders of the Jewish tradition, rule 
that artificial insemination using husband sperm is permissible, provided that natural way of 
reproduction between couples have failed in every other way (Sinclair, 2002, pp. 71–106). 
Judaism maintains that God created nature for man’s advantage and benefit, and this action is 
viewed as a positive partnership between man and God to improve nature for man’s benefit. 
There is no definite law in the Jewish tradition to prohibit performing such reproductive 
technologies so we argue that man is free to use scientific knowledge to overcome and face 
the difficulties of nature. Thus, performing IVF or other related assisted reproductive 
technologies would not be considered as an interference with and intrusion into God’s will 
and acts. Rather, these technologies would help and enable a human being to overcome the 
problem of infertility. Furthermore, reproductive technologies do not create a basic change or 
solve the mystery of life; an action which Judaism believes is made possible by the Creator. 
Thus IVF would not be tampering with the mysteries of life. Based on the medico-
psychological reasons of couples requesting IVF, it may be considered as a legitimate 
medical intervention. 
 
An objection is raised against artificial insemination for the performance of IVF within the 
Jewish tradition. The Halakhic problem arises with regard to the means of the procurement of 
semen for the purpose of IVF. There would be no Jewish legal objection against IVF, if the 
husband’s sperm is used for inseminating women. The Halakhic law prohibits ejaculation of 
semen’s of men other than that of husband into women’s reproductive tract. There is a 
minority opposition that artificial insemination done without using husband’s sperm would be 
tantamount to seed destruction and hence must be avoided. A minor group Jewish scholarship 
may argue against the collection of semen for the purpose of artificial insemination on the 
charge of seed destruction. This has evolved from the mystical belief of the kabbalist, R. 
Ovadyah Hadaya who believed that any seminal fluid not passing to the female vagina gives 
rise to demon of the night that may plague the semen-emitter and his children until the 
moment of death. 
 
Another objection raised against the artificial insemination is that instead of inseminating 
with the husband’s sperm, the wife may be inseminated with that of a stranger’s sperm 
accidentally or purposefully resulting into the birth of a child whose legal status may be 
compromised.  
 
Regarding, the first objection of seed destruction raised against the artificial insemination, it 
may be argued that the main purpose of artificial insemination is bringing a child into the 
world and it would be insignificant according to the Jewish law while fulfilling this goal of 
child birth, whether there is a break in the ejaculation of the semen and its insemination in the 
female reproductive organ. In fact, many a semen gets wasted in the natural sexual 
intercourse. 
 
Also the second objection of deliberate or mistakenly sperm replacement does not hold good, 
because the mere fear of such a scenario is not a sufficient reason to prohibit an otherwise 
well accepted procedure according to the Halakhic laws where the main purpose of 
procreation has been fulfilled. The Biblical commandment of procreation and establishment 
of family is fulfilled through IVF with the aid of artificial insemination. So these reproductive 
technologies are halakhically permitted procedure. Also it is to be noted that measures could 
have been endorsed to prevent the insemination by stranger’s semen.  
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One of the most important facts with regard to artificial insemination is that AIH (artificial 
insemination with the aid of husband) is permitted provided it is the only remaining 
halakhically acceptable method of procreation. That is to say the artificial insemination is 
permissible provided that there is no other alternative available for the couples to have their 
own child. Jewish law may also require that insemination is permissible during the menstrual 
period of the woman, when the women is considered ritually unclean (niddah) and she is 
forbidden to cohabit with her husband. Some authorities question whether AIH at all fulfils 
the biblical commandment to “be fruitful and multiply”. This is because some of the 
authorities maintain that cohabitation between couples is essential in the fulfilment of this 
commandment, but procreation through artificial insemination is bereft of such copulation 
and hence does not fulfil the commandment. However, the opposite view is that the essence 
of the commandment is to produce live progeny which the process of artificial insemination 
enables. The process adopted for procreation becomes irrelevant. Rabbi Auerbach opines that 
though AIH may not completely fulfil the biblical commandment to fruitful and multiply, yet 
it fulfils the rabbinic or Jewish obligations to procreate and populate the Earth without 
leaving the earth desolate. AIH may lack the full normative force of a biblical precept; still it 
is endowed with religious significance. It fulfils the mitzvah.3 
 
The acceptance of AIH in the Jewish society reflects the significance of infertility problem in 
the Jewish tradition. Children occupy an important place in this religious practise as well in 
this social scenario. Having children is important according to the Jewish tradition and 
artificial insemination contributes to the resolving of fertility problems and that holds 
significance to the Halakhic authorities. So there is no significant prohibition against the use 
of assisted reproduction on the basis that it is not a natural process. Whatever objections are 
raised it concern specific legal prohibitions and reservations concerning the fulfilment of the 
positive commandment to reproduce. It may be unanimously agreed that reproduction 
according to the Jewish laws may not take place in a purely natural manner. 
 
Rabbi Jakobovits notes that though there is nothing intrinsically illegal about artificial 
insemination, these artificial reproductive methods have made child birth a mechanical act 
lacking the mystical and intimately human qualities that enable man to rank with God in the 
creative propagation of the life. There may be Halakhic reservation about assisted 
reproductive technologies on the grounds of them not being a natural method of reproduction. 
That is to say, moral reservation may arise if the rabbi scholars resort to a naturalist 
discourse. The minor objections or reservation may introduce in this sense a note of caution. 
But these reservations regarding reproductive technologies and embryo experimentation do 
not close off the technological option to couples who seek reproductive assistance. Artificial 
insemination by husband provides a solution to the fertility problem, and with the production 
of a child the couples would fulfil a Mitzvah. However, it must be ensured that a technology 
of hope does not turn into a tool of abuse in the hands of unscrupulous partners. 
 
From the Jewish legal point of view, artificial insemination using the husband’s sperm is not 
so much a problem as insemination done using donor’s sperm. The main objection raised 
against the use of donor sperm in artificial insemination (AID) is that it leads to birth of a 
bastard or commit adultery or mamzerut. A mamzer according to the Jewish religious law is a 
person born from forbidden relationships (Taylor & Robinson, 1837, p. 151). There is a 
possibility that a child born due to the insemination of the sperm from a donor other than that 
of a husband may be called a product of an incestuous union. Simultaneously artificial 
																																								 																				3	mitzvah is a precept or commandment. It is a good deed done from religious duty 
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insemination using donor’s sperm is an answer to many a fertility problems like male 
infertility, low sperm counts, or lack of sperm, problems with ejaculation, inflammation of 
the testicles, abnormally developed testicles, swollen veins of the scrotum. Artificial 
insemination with the aid of donor’s sperm (AID) may be the only hope for couple’s yearning 
for a child who is genetically connected to the mother and who is the gestating mother and 
the one to give birth to the child. 
 
The question whether AID leads to the birth of a child from an incestuous union is an 
important issue in the Jewish legal system. For this we need to turn our attention to a 
Talmudic passage concerning the feasibility of a marriage between a high priest and a 
“pregnant virgin”. A woman can get pregnant even if there had been no penetrative 
intercourse, as a consequence of her entering a bath into which a man had immediately 
discharged his semen. The sperm may get on the vagina and swim up there, impregnating the 
women. Our discussion is concentrated not on the physiology of virgin conception but on the 
legal definition and status of the sexual offenses pertaining to the Jewish law. The question 
that is of importance here to the Talmud is when does a woman after having got married to a 
high priest ceases to be a virgin – is it when a woman enters into a conjugal relation with a 
man or is it when a woman becomes pregnant though she may not have had any intercourse. 
The doubt that the Talmud is trying to clear is whether, in respect of marriage to a high priest, 
a woman looses virginity just because of having had copulated with a man, or to become 
pregnant is sufficient to deprive her of her virginal status, even there have been absence of 
any act of intercourse? If the answer is that virginity is lost as a consequence of intercourse 
then the pregnant virgin would very much be allowed to marry the high priest. That what may 
be concluded as a general notion is: in all sexual offenses, the physical act of the crime is in 
intercourse and not in impregnation. So a married Jewish woman impregnated by the sperm 
of a man other than of her husband without having any conjugal relationship with the man is 
not incestuous or adulteress. 
 
It is to be noted that a Jewish single woman is forbidden to conceive by artificial 
insemination irrespective of whether the sperm is donated by a Jew or a non-Jew. The issue 
here is if a married woman is permitted to access artificial insemination by donors other than 
her husband for begetting and conceiving a child genetically related with the mother.  
   
As Talmud Bavli Shabbat Rashi and Talmud Bavli Ketubot Tosafot deciphered, it is not 
pregnancy but intercourse which makes a virgin unsuitable to marry a high priest. Rabbi 
Perez or Perez ben Elijah of Corbeil, a French Tosafist (Singer, 2003, pp. 1901–1906), rules 
that a married woman should not lie in the sheet or enter into the bath where a man other than 
her husband had left his semen. The prohibition is so incurred because Perez fears that the 
woman if becomes pregnant and gives birth to a child, that child may one day marry the 
progeny of his biological father and thus would be committing incest. Any child out of this 
union would be bastard (mamzer). Now, what R. Perez mentioned and worried about is the 
impregnation of woman who had lied in the semen-covered sheet of man other than her 
husband. His worries are based only upon the fear of possible incest. In the absence of sexual 
intercourse between the woman and the man other than her husband, mere lying on the semen 
covered sheet does not lead to mamzerut. This viewpoint is further certified from the 
principle implicit in the discussion cited from the Talmud concerning the feasibility of 
marriage between the high priest and pregnant virgin, where sexual intercourse and not 
impregnation is the decisive factor of the physical element of sexual crime under Jewish law. 
It is fear of committing possible incest that R.Perez takes as the restrictive factor on a married 
woman lying down on a semen covered sheet of a man other than her husband. 
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This goes on to show that intercourse and not impregnation constitutes the physical element 
of sexual offenses in the Jewish law or Halakhah. And this conclusion provides the primary 
supporting source for the ruling that artificial insemination of a married woman by a donor 
other than her husband does not lead to committing of incest or adultery.  
 
It is to be noted that prior to the advent of the technology of artificial insemination; 
pregnancy brought about means other than sexual intercourse was prohibited according to the 
Halakhic laws. With the onset or prevalence of artificial insemination things began in the 
Jewish tradition. The issue of conception without sexual intercourse became highly relevant 
and debatable in the Halakhic law. Following the position in the Talmud, Rabbi Moses 
Feinstein’s practical decision was that infertile couples to have their children may undergo 
artificial insemination using donor’s sperm and that action would not amount to committing 
adultery.  
 
R.Perez’s prohibition concerning the married woman lying on the semen covered sheet of 
another man other than her husband is due to his fear of possible incest. Such probable incest 
may be said to arise if there is artificial insemination from a donor’s sperm other than the 
husband. According to the Jewish law, artificial insemination using the husband’s sperm is 
permissible but it is forbidden to inseminate a woman with sperm from a Jewish donor. 
Jewish children whose biological father is a non-Jew shares no significant legal relationship 
and thus the progeny of such a father can marry the Jewish child without the fear of 
committing possible incest. R. Feinstein states that there is no question of incest or mamzerut 
in respect of AID, even if the donation is made by Jewish donor. It is the mere apprehension 
of committing probable incest between the AID child and other progeny of the same sperm 
donor that his permissive ruling remains confined to non-Jewish donor.   
 
R. Feinstein rules that insemination using the sperm of a Jewish donor would also not lead to 
adultery. So to him artificial insemination does not invoke any prohibition. AID is thus 
acceptable to him   (Rosner & Bleich, 1979, p. 116, notes–4–7). Rabbi Moshe Feinstein also 
bases his permission to use donor insemination on this source, noting that it specifically 
classifies the child as legitimate. [see Iggrot Moshe,  (Feinstein, 1959) 4 Even Ha’ezer 1:10, 
2:11, 3:11] 
 
The ruling of Rabbi Moshe Feinstein was met with severe backlash from staunch 
traditionalist exponents of Jewish laws, and Rabbi Yoel Teitelbaum is one such important 
protagonist in this context. Teitelbaum states that adultery is prohibited. Adultery is wrong 
because it results in lineage confusion, that is, there would be confusion about who is the 
father and also it involves forbidden mating. This concept is deduced from Nahmanides’ 
observation made to the effect, derived from Biblical views on adultery. There is prohibition 
in the Bible about a person carnally lying with a neighbour’s wife for seed. Rabbi Moses ben 
Nahman, also known by the Hebrew acronym “Ramban” and the Latin designation 
“Naḥmanides” was a prolific author, producing significant Talmudic commentaries. 
Naḥmanides in his “Commentary on the Torah” (Ramban, 1974) mentions that the word “to 
seed” in the Biblical prohibition on adultery implies that the offense concerns the children of 
the adulterous relationship in the sense when the child’s true ancestry remains in the dark 
(Sinclair, 2003).  
 
Based on Biblical law, R. Teitelbaum mentions that donor insemination bereft of sexual 
coupling would be committing adultery as it raises doubt about the father of the child. It is 
not possible to remove the doubt in an empirical way, that is, by keeping a track of 
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insemination by donors, because the issue involves principality and not of practice. 
According to Jewish law any method of reproduction that happens to blur the identity of the 
father would be an adulterous method. In the artificial insemination the identity of the sperm 
donor (AID) includes adultery and the child born out of it would be a mamzer. 
 
In response to R. Teitelbaum’s criticism with regard to AID in the context of Jewish law, R. 
Feinstein opines that a sharp and clear demarcation be drawn between sexual cohabitation, 
that is the physical element involved in the felony of adultery and the confusion associated 
with lineage. R. Feinstein while clarifying the definition of the concept of adultery observed 
that to take lineage confusion as the main legal issue in the lapse of adultery may result into 
perceptibly false argument where adultery with an infertile woman is not illegal, as there is 
no fear of lineage confusion where a woman is infertile. So, sexual union is the sole factor 
that constitutes the core element in the crime of infidelity or adultery. On the other hand, 
lineage confusion is a peripheral offense of the adultery issue. Beside this R. Teitelbaum has 
based his argument on the Naḥmanides’s “Commentary on the Torah” which is strictly 
speaking not an authoritative work on Halakhical matters. R. Feinstein claims R. 
Teitelbaum’s main legal argument consisting of lineage confusion in the Biblical 
misdemeanour of adultery has no genuine normative basis. R. Feinstein’s opinion is that there 
is no Halakhic hindrance to artificial insemination by donor only that non- Jewish sperm be 
used. If the progeny of AID be female, even she has no bar in marrying a Jewish priest. 
Though by Halakhic laws artificial insemination is not a compulsory method as this method 
per se may not be a valid procedure for fulfilling the Biblical commandment to procreate – to 
be fruitful and multiply. R. Feinstein thus reiterates his original response that a couple in 
“dire need” may proceed with the procedure of artificial insemination using sperm from non-
Jewish donors. The donor being not Jewish, there is no chance that a Jewish child conceived 
from his sperm will marry a Jewish progeny sired by the same AID donor though with a 
different Jewish mother. This is the case since two children procreated by different Jewish 
mothers but sired by the same non-Jewish father, naturally or by AID, are not halakhically 
brother and sister (Lasker, 1988, p. 6). R. Auerbach seconds the fact that there are no visible 
Jewish legal impediments in the use of the method of artificial insemination with the aid of 
non- Jewish donor for procreation. Even they claim the child is eligible to marry a kohen 
(priest). So, a couple who’s other method of procreation have not succeeded and in dire need 
then they may avail of the sperm from sperm bank, where there is every chance that the 
majority of donors would be non-Jews. The Torah does not explicitly mention of conferring 
Jewish status through matrilineality. But in Mishnah, which serves as the Jewish law we find 
a basic shift in Rabbinic Judaism from patrilineal to matrilineal descent. The central Rabbinic 
text concerning the matrilineal principle finds mention in the Mishnah (Kiddushin 3:12) 
(Susan, 2002; Danby, 1933, p. 327). The final clause of the Mishnah tates that the Jewishness 
of the child follows the mother and not the father. Any [woman] who cannot contract 
kiddushin with this man or with other particular man, the child follows her status. A lot of 
controversy continued concerning the status of children born of a Jewish mother and non-
Jewish father, some regarded the offspring of such unions as Jewish but blemished. At the 
same time others supported R. Simeon and declared the offspring to be kasher (fit) and 
legitimate (Cohen, 1999, p. 280). 
 
Thus most of the Halakhic or Jewish authorities unanimously agree that the technique of AID 
does not result into adultery under Jewish law. The main opposition against AID is based on 
morality. As Rabbi Jakobovits states that the prime objection to AID is that it is a mechanical 
act which lacks the human sentiment that is found to be profoundly connected with conjugal 
love and emotion. This is one of the moral discomfort aspects raised against the use of AID. 
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There are others like Rabbi Yehiel Weinberg who point out that the act of insemination of a 
stranger’s sperm like that of a non-Jew’s into the womb of a married woman is considered as 
an ugly act which is an act of abomination. It is to be noted that Rabbis like Yaakov Breisch, 
Weinberg opines that AID is opposed to religious sensibility. 
Maternal identity is an issue with regard to IVF where the genetic mother and the birth 
mother is not same, thus engaging a surrogate mother in this regard. Rabbi Auerbach 
dismisses the technique of surrogacy a priori. In the Jewish tradition in case of surrogacy, the 
birth mother and the egg donor who is the genetic mother is regarded as mother of the 
impending child. Surrogacy is considered as morally offensive in the contemporary Jewish 
thought especially when one resort to this technique for convenience so as to avoid the 
encumbrance of pregnancy. Using another person as “incubator” or “substratum” for carrying 
a baby and delivering the baby for monetary benefit is a revolting degradation of maternity 
and an insult to human dignity. In the context of using donor’s womb and donor’s egg 
questions arise about the determination of the maternity of the birth child in the Jewish 
tradition. As far as Jewish law is concerned, based on Talmudic analogies some rabbis 
consider it is the nurturing and the birth giving mother and not the biological mother who is 
the legal mother of the child. A handful of rabbis hold the genetic mother to be the legal 
mother. There are still others who opine that both the biological or genetic mother and the 
gestating mother hold the maternity of the child.  
Those who consider the birth giving mother the Halakhic mother of the child have based their 
opinion on the following arguments.  
Those mothers who converted to Judaism during pregnancy are not subjected to law of 
levirate marriage and halitzah yet the sons of such mothers would be restricted from marrying 
each other’s wives. The law of levirate union is not applicable because the brothers are not 
connected from their father’s side and, as when non-Jewish sperm is used for insemination, 
the non-Jewish paternity remains unrecognisable according to the Jewish law. Levirate law is 
applicable to brothers begotten from the same father. Though any biological relationship of a 
child with non-Jewish father is bereft of legal significance yet the sons would be prohibited to 
marry their brother’s widow. The prohibition is so applicable because they are considered 
brothers from the maternal side.  
A question may arise that a mother who has got converted to Judaism and adopted Jewish 
culture during her gestation period are supposed to put an end to every pre-existing legal ties 
with family members of the same genetic constituent, then how come the above stated two 
males are considered brothers from the mother’s side? It may be stated that it is true a convert 
has to terminate every link with members of the same biological family and that a convert is 
legally permitted to be in a marriage union with any converted relative, this is so as all 
converted are believed to be born anew. But rabbinic law forbids marriage between 
biological relatives. It is not biological or genetic connection with mothers that make the two 
males as brothers, but the fact that they are brothers as they are born out of the same womb of 
a Jewish mother. So these brothers of the same mother are legally bounded and prohibited by 
law to be in conjugal union with each other’s wives. It shows that maternity is established 
through birth giving and not through genetic makeup. 
There are other Jewish authorities who consider both the genetic and birth giving mother as 
the legal mother of the child. As Rabbi Avraham Steinberg concurred with Rabbi J. David 
Bleich concludes that a child born out of surrogacy has two mothers – from the ovum donor 
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and the surrogate mother (Bleich, 1983, pp. 91–93). Rabbi Yekutiel Kamelhar, while 
discussing about maternity in the case of ovary implantation in a woman’s body, has drawn 
parallel with plant transplantation (Skolnik, 1972, pp. 1467–1468). According to the Halakhic 
laws encompassing the agricultural area, one is strictly prohibited to consume the fruit of an 
orlah branch during the first three years after planting. The Hebrew word “orlah” means 
foreskin or uncircumcised. After three years plantation of trees the fruits of such a tree is not 
forbidden to be consumed. In the fourth year the fruits are valued as holy and are to be 
offered in praise of the Lord. It is from fifth year onwards the fruits of such a tree can be 
consumed. It takes time for the grafted branch to get one with the main tree. So by fifth year 
the transplant becomes an integral part of the tree on to which it was grafted and its fruit 
would be ready for consumption. Similarly, in the case of ovary implantation or donor 
insemination, the transplant for the sake of safety needs to be handled as if they were the 
outcome of both the donor and the done. Thus a child of surrogate mother, according to the 
Halakhic command is forbidden to be in conjugal union both into the families of egg donor 
and into the families of birth giving mother. Though the concept of the double mother looks 
promising from a scientific standpoint yet modern genetics strongly favour the biological 
mother, who is the donor, from the birth-giving mother. However most of the Rabbis opine 
that a woman may be termed “mother” only upon parturition. As Rabbi Mackler states that an 
embryo is part of the mother rather than an independent entity. So to them the surrogate 
mother is the mother (Mackler, 2000, pp. 179–181).   
 
It is natural to presume that traditional Jewish law lacks clarity about the concept of the role 
of female eggs in human reproduction and so it would be unlikely that Jewish law developed 
with prominence of maternity based on conception alone. There is a clear lack of a 
genetically friendly approach to maternity in the Jewish law. 
 
Thus, it may be deduced that there are no exact precedents that may help in defining 
motherhood in the case of surrogacy. Beside this, if a Jewish woman decides to donate her 
surplus ova or egg to a gentile woman, in that scenario one may wonder whether her Jewish 
religion is a constituent part of her genetics. Or, do we infer that ova donated to a gentile by a 
Jewish woman carry the religion. Are we to assume it to be true that with the ova donation 
one would be guilty of turning a Jewish child over to a non-Jew? This situation is viewed as 
an uncommon scenario in association with the potential problem connected with ova 
donation. There are those who feel maternity does not inherit in ova. Those women would 
have undergone successful IVF treatment with surplus ova which she decides to donate to 
other infertile women or to a clinic for experiments. Civil law of Israel requires the consent of 
parents before the disposal of the ova. Halakhic law is not in favour of seed wastage. Instead 
of active destruction of ova Halakhic law is in favor of passive treatment of ova which allows 
it to die by itself. If ova become non-viable, Halakhic law is liberal enough to allow the use 
of embryo for experimentation. Thus by Halakhic law Judaism is determined by parturiency 
or gravidity and not by considering women as donors of Jewish genetic materials or rather as 
carrier of female seed. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Jewish law which has a long history in the medical arena, constitutes a vast store house of 
primary and secondary principles with a solution based approach to problems in this area. It 
is worth mentioning that rational decisions are always difficult and involve hard ethical 
choices. In spite of reservations, reproductive technologies and experimentation with 
embryos are being permitted by Jewish law. The Mitzvah of having one’s own children is so 
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great that couples readily avail this opportunity to procreate their offspring. Critics may opine 
that these processes involve some thorny questions and situations. There is no harm in 
admitting that every technology has its advantages and disadvantages. But with explicit 
rationing of the reproductive technologies, ARTs would find its proper usage. 
 It is to be noted that the most fundamentalist branch of the orthodox Jewry maintains that the 
Jewish law or Halakhic law also called the Torah is not in conflict with Science. Rabbis opine 
that the human mind with its creative intelligence can resolve conflict and should be never 
blinded by dogma. One should be guided by the principles of the Torah and based on these 
principles and individuals should figure out what is right and required. Thus the most 
orthodox of rabbinic minds maintain that “Torah should be a window to view the universe 
with an open mind and should not be a wooden shutter” (Silber, 2010, pp. 471–480). 
Thus, it may be concluded that the strictest and most orthodox of Jewish theological 
scholarship finds that the Torah and Halakhic rule is not in conflict with reproductive 
technologies. In fact it is a religious obligation for Jews to preserve the possibility of future 
parenthood, safeguard fertility and to “be fruitful and multiply”.   
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